Affinity and the Passional Conspiracy

“Liberated desire is an expansive energy—an opening of possibilities—and wants to share projects and actions, joys and pleasures, love and revolt.  Insurrection of one may indeed be possible.  I would even argue that it is the necessary first step towards a shared insurrectional project.  But an insurrection of two, three, many increases courage and enjoyment and opens a myriad of passional possibilities.” Wolfi Landstreicher “Against the Logic of Submission,” Willful Disobedience (95)

The notion that there is an impossible conflict between the individual and the social remains on a shallow level.  A tension, certainly, but not a contradiction.  It is through just these sorts of tensions that greater levels can be achieved.  Shallow thinkers have proposed that one must choose between individualism and the communal.  Yet it is possible to have community, friendship, and alliances while still remaining individualist.  These are the good things that communism supposedly brings, but really it doesn’t.  Communism is an ideology based on a shallow reification of these values.  Actually, my individualism is enhanced by the presence of others whom I value.  This doesn’t invalidate the sentiments of pessimism towards others that is so easy to feel, merely negates the universality of the proposition.  William Burroughs called the sort of person who one can find affinity with, but is able to mind their own business and not manipulate others, a Johnson.  He said “Yes, you found a Johnson, but you waded through shitville to find him.  You always do.  Just when you think the world is exclusively populated by shits, you find a Johnson” (Burroughs x).  Much of the time it does feel like every person encountered is terrible, but there are always people to connect with through bonds of friendship and affinity.  There is no need for a mass or majority in order to begin the war.  In fact, it is an impossible place to start.

When individuals come together based on affinity, they are able to accomplish greater things than alone.  These bonds of affinity take the form of synergistic mutuality: the combination of forces do not function together as arithmetic, but as a gestalt greater than the sum of their parts.  When these connections are based on affinity they are the opposite of the herd.  Instead, they are an amplification of the individual, the union of self-owning ones.  Contrasting his preferred view of individualist organization against the hive society and the state, Max Stirner said “For me, the egoist, the welfare of this ‘human society’ is not in my heart. I sacrifice nothing for it, I only use it, but to be able to use it completely, I transform it instead into my property and my creation; in other words, I destroy it and in its place form the association of egoists” (Stirner 192).  In a way I like the more archaic translation that was used by Stephen Byington: the “Union of Egoists,” as it more directly contrasts this view of affinity to leftist collectivism.

It isn’t always easy to find these connections (Nietzsche said: “I had reason to look about me for scholarly, bold, and industrious comrades (I am still looking)” (21)).  The desire for affinity and community can take the form of a selfish one.  “If I write, it is not as they say, ‘for others,’”  said Raoul Vaneigem, “I have no wish to exorcise other people’s ghosts.  I string words together as a way of getting out of the well of isolation, because I need others to pull me out” (Vaneigem 111).  The best way to look at this selfish affinity is as friendship.  Passionate friendship can take a form that is extreme, intense.  Or, as George Orwell described a soldier in the Spanish Civil War, “It was the face of a man who would commit murder and throw away his life for a friend” (3).

The notion that the needs of the individual and the social are irreconcilable is a miserabilist notion.  One does not need to choose between being an individualist or a communist.  Bob Black suggests the reconciliation take the form of “Marxism-Stirnerism,” through which “every orthodoxy prating of freedom or liberation is called into question, anarchism included” (Black Abolition 130).  It might be said that one could be an egoist communist, but even this is misleading.  Individualists have always desired affinity, compassion, and mutuality.  In short, a communal structure.  The communal structure must be flexible and malleable to do this, a sort of chaotic system.  This is intrinsic to the anarchist project to begin with.  The classical anarcho-communists were individualists.  The classical individualist anarchists believed in community.  Yet even though this is intrinsic, both sides unfortunately forget in practice.  Anarcho-communists become ideologues for the organized collective (now more than ever).  Individual anarchists fall into atomized alienation.  Bob Black, expanding from his concept “Marxism-Stirnerism,” proposed the idea of “Type 3” anarchism—both communist and egoist: “the Type 3 anarchist categorically rejects categorization” and “takes more out of anarchism than anarchism takes out of her” (Black Defacing 54-55).  It is leftist dogma that a moral person who desires liberation must reject selfishness.  With this they throw away a great weapon and draw to them the chains of a reified notion of liberation.  My selfishness includes the selfishness for a world where my friends and loved ones are free, vital, and feral.  My selfishness might, like James Walker’s selfishness, “hope better things from you” (Walker 5).

Max Stirner explained this affinity by stating “if the world is ours, it no longer attempts any violence against us, but only with us.  My selfishness has an interest in the liberation of the world, so that it will become my property” (Stirner 318).  Alienation does nothing for the health of my subjectivity.  It craves the nourishment of the subjectivities of others.  Bob Black described this expansive egoism: “The radically and rationally (self)conscious egoist, appreciating this, enriches him-self in and through other subjectivities.  In social life at its (con)sensual and satisfying best—sex, conversation, creation—taking from and giving to others constitutes a single play-activity rich with multiplier effects.  For the lucid and ludic egoist, anything less than generalized egoism is just not enough” (Black Abolition 129).

Stephen Duncombe provided a model of how such a union of self-owning ones might function in the form of the zine network (which still defiantly exists, despite the technocracy’s frantic pleas that we believe in its death): “a zine network proposes something different: a community of people linked via bonds of difference, each sharing their originality… This model is the very essence of a libertarian community: individuals free to be who they want and to cultivate their own interests, while simultaneously sharing in each other’s difference” (Duncombe 58).  In this way it can be an example of an unfolding heterotopia, a community of difference.  Other examples of such structures based on radical difference might be found in queer communities, particularly in examples like radical faeries.  Radical faeries are particularly notable in this regard, as they arose as the opposition party within the opposition party of gay liberation.  They adopted a stance of being intrinsically different, rather than a marginal political group that would be just like anyone else if afforded political protections.  Instead they tended towards a chaotic paganism for spirituality and the anarchic for politics.  Most importantly they embrace the dropout ethics, trying to build rural land bases that could serve as a point of escape, even if on a temporary basis.  Jack Davis, participant, provided this definition: “Radical Faeries tend to be the people who don’t fit into any mainstream—gay or otherwise.  When I went to my first Radical Faerie gathering, I saw all these other fags didn’t fit in, either.  They were political, they did ritual, and they were funny.  It felt like ‘coming home’—finding all these other weird people who only did the same crazy things I did—they appreciated that I did them” (Vale and Sulak 189).

The informal organization of the anarchist hunter gatherer societies exhibits many of the traits I have been talking about. There is a strong sense of sharing, gift giving, and reciprocation.  Yet there is not a formal sense of obligation, or a permanent tie to one relationship.  One anthropology text described how “social density always seems in a state of flux as people spend more or less time away from camp and as they move to other camps, either on visits or more permanently” (Haviland 160).  This can be for external reasons, such as resource shortage, or for internal reasons, such as conflicts that can’t be resolved or just getting on each other’s nerves.  Either way, this is one way to preserve the community, by not making the ties rigid and permanent.

A strong resistance, an insurrectionary situation, can often be actualized when a multitude comes together.  The anonymous tract At Daggers Drawn said “to say we are the only rebels in a sea of submission is reassuring because it puts an end to the game in advance.  We are simply saying that we do not know who our accomplices are and we need a social tempest to discover them” (23).  Sometimes an isolated individual is capable of only a futile thrashing out, a meaningless violence.  A multitude can apply strong pressure with the use of almost no violence and break down structures of domination.  The multitude is capable of some level of success, the individual capable only of becoming a martyr.  Ideally this works synergistically, with individual acts leading to a spreading affinity.  This union further valorizes the individual.  Ideally this creates a feedback loop “in the spreading revolt we will really be able to perceive a marvelous conspiracy of egos aimed at creating society without bosses or domination.  A society of free and unique individuals” (At Daggers Drawn 29).

To be clear though, the multitude are often highly problematic.  Even though structures and processes are presented as non-authoritarian alternatives, such as consensus decision-making, these processes can be dangerous in that they conceal power dynamics which have been internalized.  They also encourage abstractions such as “the consent of the people,” which are highly destructive.  There is no such thing as “the people,” only specific groupings of people.  To gain consent of such a massive grouping is functionally impossible.  Those who claim to have such are fooling themselves with illusion.  The structures of mass society have rendered a large portion of people into a herd or cog state (as many, or more, of these people can be found among the anarchist subcultural scene).  The class struggle social democrat faction of anarchism does nothing to alleviate this problem, merely attempting to manipulate the masses into their organization federation pyramid/ponzi schemes.  If they were to succeed it would be an even more dehumanizing scenario than our current corporate state.  Luckily the average person hasn’t been destroyed enough (even after school and work!) to fall for these federation schemes.

This isn’t necessarily the most cynical view.  Organization can easily be temporary and pragmatic.  Renzo Novatore stated that he intended to find struggles that he felt affinity with but after the struggle was complete continue on a line of flight: “When you will be ready—God, what an endless wait!—it won’t nauseate me to go along the road a while with you!  But when you stop, I shall continue on my mad and triumphant march toward the great and sublime conquest of nothing!” (135).  This isn’t against affinity or action, this is against permanence and rigid organization.

What this leaves is the affinity group.  The majority will never change anything, but a small group of dissatisfied weirdos who come together based on affinity could throw off the constraints of authority and liberate their desires.  They would be an irresistible force, totally seductive.  This conspiracy might even actualize our wildest dreams, an abolition of the mass because the mass refused to be herded.  They could become autonomous individuals, a rising of free spirits!  And even if this fails, it’s better than a lifetime of misery.

Works cited:

Anonymous.  At Daggers Drawn.  Trans. Jean Weir.  Portland OR: Eberhardt Press, 2009.

Black, Bob.  The Abolition of Work and Other Essays.  Port Townsend, WA: Loompanics Unlimited, 1986.

Black, Bob.  Defacing the Currency.  Berkeley CA: LBC books, 2012.

Burroughs, William S.  Queer.  NY: Penguin, 1985, 1987.

Duncombe, Stephen.  Notes from Underground: Zines and the Politics of Alternative Culture.  Bloomington, IN: Microcosm, 1997, 2008.

Haviland, William.  Cultural Anthropology (10th edition).  Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt, 2002.

Landstreicher, Wolfi.  Willful Disobedience.  Berkeley, CA: Ardent Press, 2009.

Nietzsche, Friedrich.  The Genealogy of Morals & Ecce Homo.  Trans. Walter Kaufman.  NY: Vintage, 1967, 1989.

Novatore, Renzo.  The Collected Works of Renzo Novatore.  Trans. Wolfi Landstreicher.  Berkeley, CA: Ardent 2012.

Orwell, George.  Homage to Catalonia.  NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1952.

Stirner, Max.  The Unique and Its Property.  Trans. Wolfi Landstreicher.  Baltimore, MD: Underworld Amusements, 2017.

Vale, V and John Sulak.  RE/Search: Modern Pagans.  San Francisco: RE/Search Publications, 2001.

Vaneigem, Raoul.  The Revolution of Everyday Life.  Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, London: Rebel Press.  1983, 1993, 2006.Walker, James L.  “What is Justice?” Enemies of Society: An Anthology of Individualist and Egoist Thought.  Berkeley CA: Ardent Press, 2011.

Stirner and Capitalism

There is a curious statement in Robert Anton Wilson and Robert Shea’s novel Illuminatus!:

“Most anarchists hoped Joachim-like, to redistribute the wealth, but Rebecca had once told him about a classic of anarchist literature, Max Stirner’s The Ego and His Own, which has been called ‘the Billionaire’s Bible’ because it stressed the advantages the rugged individualist would gain in a stateless society.” (53)

For those of us who have read Stirner, this is an odd statement.  It might be assumed that this was purposeful, one of Wilson’s guerrilla ontology tactics, and that it was put forward in such a manner only to later deconstruct its underlying assumptions.  Of course, equally possible it was meant at face value, particularly considering Wilson’s soft spot for free-market libertarianism and capitalism.  This sort of view of Stirner, and egoism in general, is an all too common assumption.  Stirner is often viewed as a proponent of an extreme form of anarcho-capitalism.  This view, however, is unfounded.

There is a common misconception that Stirner was some sort of rogue capitalist.  Certainly some of his disciples have contributed to this notion.  In his writings, Stirner rarely ventured into the realm of economics.  When he did so it was to dispel the spooks of economics.  He argued that people by nature are egoists, and that ideologies to the contrary merely serve as rationalization and justification for egoism.  It would be better to be honest about motivation.  It has been common for some to equate this viewpoint with capitalism.  The underlying assumption made by many is that capitalism is individualist, thus Stirner supported capitalism.  This is not what Stirner said.

Most of Stirner’s concepts and projects were negative, that is they were intended to break down structures and ideologies.  One of the few positive projects he proposed is the “Union of Egoists”(79), which he did not really define.  By nature this union could not be strictly defined, as it is fluid, open and dynamical.  It was a proposal for individuals to come together with others, in a fashion that does not compromise the self, but rather amplifies it.  He never proposed that individuals should not work together or share.  On the contrary, friendship may be one of the most powerful egoist tools.  The egoist can give up many things for friendship, as Stirner argued:

“I can with joy sacrifice to him numberless enjoyments, I can deny myself numberless things for the enhancement of his pleasure, and I can hazard for him what without him was the dearest to me, my life, my welfare, my freedom.  Why, it constitutes my pleasure and my happiness to refresh myself with his happiness and his pleasure.  But myself, my own self, I do not sacrifice to him, but remain an egoist and – enjoy him”(290).

Some might mistake his skepticism and criticism of alternatives, such as communism, as a defense of capitalism.  I don’t think that it is.  When he said “If you know a better medium of exchange, go ahead; yet it will be a ‘money’ again”(274), it seems to be a criticism that communism is merely a new form of capitalism.  Really, the egoist wants autonomy and liberty for themselves, and the autonomy and liberty of others enhances this.  The problems of capitalism, such as division of labor, were dealt with by Stirner, such as when he argued that “if I do not trouble myself about my affair, I must be content with what pleases others to vouchsafe me.  To  have bread is my affair, my wish and desire, and yet people leave that to the bakers”(275).

The structure of capitalism is not a reflection of individualism or egoism.  It isn’t even necessary to refer to Stirner to come to this conclusion.  Capitalism relies on a massive structure of manufacturing and social control.  It has division of labor at its root.  Division of labor is not the same as specialization.  Specialization means that a person may have a particular set of skills that they are most adept at, or most enjoy.  Division of labor means that each task is broken down into repetitive blocks in order to improve efficiency.  A person cannot build a car themselves, they are reliant on a massive megamachine of manufacturing.  Even if a person has all the mechanical skills to assemble the pieces, they do not have the capability to manufacture the pieces or to forge the necessary tools or to mine the raw materials for its production.  This always relies on a collective form, and of the worst sort.  This is a form that has alienation, boredom and even slavery as its component parts.

It may be beneficial to look towards Raoul Vaneigem for some ideas as to how to get out of this position.  Vaneigem was one of the primary theorists of the Situationist International, and might have his philosophy defined as egoist communism.  He criticized masters not on moral grounds, but because “masters, and God himself, are weak because of the shortcomings of those whom they govern.  The master knows the positive role of alienation, the slave its negative one, but both are denied full mastery”(204).  Capitalism eliminates the masters, leaving “just slaves-who-consume-power, distin-guishable from one another only by reference to the relative quantity of power they consume”(207).  Vaneigem proposed a solution to this problem, the coming of “masters without slaves”(207).  In his view, the proletariat should adopt an egoist position and become “the bearer of the end of class distinctions and of hierarchy”(213).

In the end, the egoist is no friend of capitalism.  It is another spook to be destroyed.  The writing of Stirner reflects this.  Yet one doesn’t need Stirner to come to this conclusion, it is obvious when considering the nature of capitalism, the megamachine that turns individuals into components of an artificial system.  Petit bourgeois tactics, such as becoming an independent craftsman, may be useful survival strategies on a temporary basis, but make terrible ideologies.  The individual is never free under capitalism, even if they get a bigger cubicle.  I want to destroy the walls of the cubicle, escape from work and production altogether.  I don’t want to do this alone, though.  I want a union of egoists to join me.  At first a limited union may feel like enough but soon the mere possibility of having to encounter slavery in any form will feel disgusting enough that it will have to be destroyed, just out of fear that it might spread its infection.

Works cited:

Stirner, Max.  The Ego and His Own.  trans.

Stephen T Byington. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1973, 2005.

Vaneigem, Raoul.  The Revolution of Everyday Life.  trans.  Donald Nicholson-Smith.  London, Rebel Press, 1983, 2006.

Wilson, Robert Anton and Robert Shea.  The Illuminatus! Trilogy. NY: Dell, 1975, 1988.