

anchorage anarchy

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Don't Ask? Don't Tell? Don't Enlist!

One might think from all the hype that some earth-shattering step forward has just taken place for americans who fuck and suck with others of the same sex. Now they can participate in the murder of people in distant lands without having to lie about whom they have sex with. And this is something to be striven for and celebrated?

I am an anarchist and believe that government in all its forms, as well as all other power structures and non-voluntary hierarchies, should be eradicated in its (and their) entirety. I am also an abolitionist, in that I advocate the immediate elimination of the state and welcome any diminution of its power to kill, tax, bully, threaten, regulate, and otherwise interfere in the life and affairs of those whom it purports to represent and/or rule. I oppose both the warfare and the welfare that are its products. So how should an anarchist react to "reforms," especially an initiative like allowing homosexually active people to openly serve (the evil empire), which appears to many as an achievement that allows people more freedom than they previously had?

While I oppose the very existence of government, the state shows no signs of withering away at present. Therefore, I take a pragmatic approach to its activities. All of us are compelled, to one extent or another, to recognize the power of the government and pay tribute to it, whether literally or figuratively. There is thus a sound argument that our self-appointed guardians should not discriminate in their treatment of those from whom they extort their lifeblood, tax revenues. So I argue that the state should not consider the sex, skin color, worldview, or sexual tastes of the person involved when providing services such as monetary assistance to poor people, health care,

food stamps, voluntary educational opportunities, etc. Needless to say, none of these services is really voluntary since all are supported by theft in the form of taxation, but no one is compelled to accept any of them.



In addition, there are compulsory interactions with the state which should be free of arbitrary discrimination. I am opposed to all the laws and regulations with which we are plagued, but I think that their enforcement is rendered even more detestable when people of certain skin colors, for example, are penalized more commonly and more severely than other people of lighter complexion.

And when people are forced to deal with government bureaucrats in order to go about the business of daily living, like when drivers or nurses are required to obtain a license to operate a vehicle or provide health care, their appearance, beliefs, or sex lives should have no bearing on their dealings with the powers-that-be.


But there are some institutions of government are so foul that any participation in them by anyone is reprehensible and indefensible. The military is the institution that springs most quickly to mind. The army, navy, air force, etc, are



organizations committed to armed, forcible enforcement of the whims of people who have arrogated to themselves the power to tell others how to live their lives and interact with others. They invade other countries where they slaughter civilians and retreating conscriptees when ordered to do so; they kill and incarcerate people engaging in voluntary and peaceful activities that their masters find distasteful; they confiscate and destroy people's property; and they have a license to kill anyone who does not submit to their orders. While much publicity is given to the occasional "humanitarian mission" of some branch of the military, this phrase is window-dressing to cover up the force, violence, and abuse of people just going about their business which are, necessarily and inevitably, part of such an undertaking. Meanwhile, the members of any military organization are treated as chattel who risk death themselves if they don't follow orders.

Given the malignant role of the state and its armed servants, how can anyone who claims to pursue a freer world welcome the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell? The only principled position to take is that not only should openly homosexually-inclined people be barred from the military, but so should those who get busy with people of the opposite sex, as well as those who have no interest in sexual activity at all. Calling for its abolition is the only libertarian approach to any discussion of the state-sponsored death machine. But until that comes about, freedom-seekers advocate a boycott of the military, not the extension of an invitation to join to an even larger pool of wanna-be indentured servants and killers.

Don't ask? Don't tell? Don't enlist!



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Anarchism and Anarcho-Capitalism, Part 3

This is the third and final installment of an article by Richard Garner. The entire article will be published as an on-line pamphlet on the Bad Press website in 2011.

Exploitation and Justice

Karl Marx liked to pretend that he was not making a moral critique of capitalism. However, he plainly used morally loaded terms, and it is equally obvious that his followers plainly think that capitalism, or what they perceive as capitalism, is *unjust*. The same goes for socialist anarchists. Before looking at this, though, I'll say something quick about theories of distributive justice. Robert Nozick has observed that theories of distributive justice can be differentiated in three ways. Some of them are "end state" theories of distributive justice; others are "patterned theories" of distributive justice; others are "historical entitlement" theories of distributive justice. A historical entitlement theory of justice says that what determines whether a given distribution of holdings is just is the process, or set of processes, by which that distribution came about; if it came about in accordance with a given process or set of processes, then that distribution of holdings is just. Patterned and end state theories, on the other hand, say that no matter how the distribution of a set of holdings came about, what determines whether or not the distribution of a set of holdings is just is what it looks like, or whether certain people hold certain things, or quantities of things. Libertarians and market anarchists typically hold to historical entitlement theories of justice, rather than end state or patterned theories. For instance, Lysander Spooner wrote that,

Each man has the natural right to acquire all he honestly can, and to enjoy and dispose of all that he honestly acquires; and the protection of these rights is all that any one has a right to ask of government in relation to them. It is all he *can* have, consistently with the equal rights of others. If government give any individual more than

this, it can only do it by taking from others. It, therefore, in doing so, only robs one of a portion of his natural, just and equal rights, in order to give to another more than his natural, just, and equal rights.ⁱ

In Spooner's passage, the acquisition of a holding must occur by a particular process – "honest" means – in order to be just, and if it comes about by those means, then it *is* just. The size of a particular holding is irrelevant – how it was obtained is the only salient feature. The implications of holding to the contrary, Spooner notes, are that some people are entitled to less than they can honestly obtain, and others are entitled to *more* than they can honestly obtain. Alternatively, Robert Nozick summarizes the historical entitlement view as being that *a distribution of holdings that arises by just means from a previously just distribution of holdings is itself just*.



i make the rules

This difference between theories of justice may seem unclear, but clarity will be shown by my next point: Marxist and other socialist claims that the distribution of holdings under capitalism is unjust take three forms. First, they are, in some sense, *inegalitarian* – distributions are unequal, some people get, have or receive so much more than others. Secondly, communist socialists at least think that holdings should be distributed, and will be under communism, "from each according to ability, to each according to need," whilst under

capitalism, some people have holdings that they don't have a real need for, whilst others need holdings that they don't have. Thirdly, socialists of all stripes hold that some people under capitalism are not entitled to their holdings because they obtained them by exploitation – the set of holdings is unjust because it rose by exploitative means.

PEACEFUL ANARCHY

Now, the interesting thing to note is that each of these criticisms reflects each different, and ultimately incompatible, type of theory of distributive justice. Egalitarianism is an end state theory of distributive justice, since it says that, no matter how it comes about, a distribution of holdings is just if and only if each person's holdings are, in some sense, equal to those of others. The second, "From each according to ability, to each according to need," is plainly a patterned theory of justice, providing a pattern that a set of holdings must conform to. However, the last is of most interest to me, since it is plainly historical: It says that a set of holdings is unjust if, and because, it arose by exploitative means, with the corresponding alternative that it is necessary (perhaps not sufficient) for a set of holdings to be just that it arises by non-exploitative means. This is also a point that Robert Nozick has noticed:

One traditional socialist view is that workers are entitled to the product and full fruits of their labor; they have earned it; a distribution is unjust if it does not give the workers what they are entitled to. Such entitlements are based upon some past history . . . This socialist rightly, in my view, holds onto the notions of earning, producing, entitlement, desert, and so forth.ⁱⁱ

Likewise, HS Foxwell, in his introduction to Anton Menger's survey of socialist doctrines, *The*

Right to the Whole Produce of Labour, writes that the work "leaves us with a conception of two great principles which dispute for primacy, the right to subsistence and the right to the whole product of labour. These two claims he [Menger] clearly shows to be inconsistent both in theory and in practice, in spirit and in effect."ⁱⁱⁱ

This observation is important because I think that socialists, whether Marxists or not, cannot hold to their opposition to exploitation whilst also holding their commitment to the end state or patterned views of distributive justice: Their commitment to either egalitarianism, or to distribution from each according to ability, to each according to need, obliges them to accept the possibility that some people may be entitled to less than they can obtain by non-exploitative means, and others are entitled to more than they can obtain by non-exploitative means. This latter plainly justifies exploitation, either in the name of equality, or in the name of distributing from each according to ability and to each according need. This is simply because it is at least logically possible that, even if they employ non-exploitative methods, some people may obtain more than they need, and more than others hold, and others may, perhaps because they are physically or mentally disabled, obtain less than they need, or less than others hold. The belief that this is unjust surely entails that justice requires taking from those who have more (than they need, or just more than others) a portion of the holdings that they acquired by non-exploitative means, and giving it to others who have less (than they need, or just less than others) than others were able to obtain by non-exploitative means. These latter people are, then, surely *entitled* to more than they can obtain by non-exploitative means, and it would not, therefore, be an injustice for them to take what they are entitled to from others.

All this means that either socialists must admit that the fact that a distribution arose by non-exploitative means is neither necessary or sufficient to declare it just or that justice can require exploitation, or they must admit that,

provided a set of holdings came about by non-exploitative means, the fact that it is distributed unequally, or that some people do not give according to ability or receive according to need, is not sufficient to declare it unjust.

Personally, I adhere to a historical view of justice that says that a distribution is just if it came about by people voluntarily exercising rights they held under a previous just distribution. This would mean that rights were not violated in the creation of a new distribution of holdings. If, in the meantime, I exercise my rights in a way that others claim involves my being exploited, but is a way that I want to exercise them, then it is no business of theirs, and preventing me from doing so entails preventing me from exercising my rights. In short, if I want to be exploited and can be so by exercising my rights, proper respect for my rights means letting me be exploited.

“Anarcho”-capitalists are Simply Apologists For Existing Class Tyranny and Exploitation

This claim is entirely erroneous: The central anarcho-capitalist theorist Murray Rothbard, in an unpublished letter, wrote

For some time I have come to the conclusion that the grave deficiency in the current output and thinking of our libertarians and “classical liberals” is an enormous blind spot when it comes to big business. There is a tendency to worship Big Business *per se* ... and a corollary tendency to fail to realize that while big business would indeed merit praise if they won that bigness on the purely free market, that in the contemporary world of total neo-mercantilism and what is essentially a neo-fascist “corporate state,” bigness is *a priori* highly suspect, because Big Business most likely got that way through an intricate and decisive network of subsidies, privileges, and direct and indirect grants of monopoly protection.

Heavily conservative-leaning anarcho-capitalist economist Hans-Herman Hoppe, on the core elements of Marxist class theory, has announced “I claim that all of them are essentially

correct.”^{iv} Likewise, at the first New York Libertarian Conference, *The Libertarian Forum* reported


Mario J. Rizzo, an honors senior in economics at Fordham University, proved to be one of the stars of the Conference, giving a brilliant paper standing Marx on his head, and arguing that, in the kind of interventionist, corporate state economy that we have today, business profits indeed tend to be an index of exploitation of the rest of society, since they are usually derived from the use of State privilege. In short, much of Marx, while totally fallacious for competitive, free-market capitalism, turns out to be unwittingly applicable to the state-monopoly system that we suffer under today.^v

So, radical, extreme, “privatize everything” defenders of capitalism, essentially endorse Marxist criticisms of existing society and its distributions of wealth? How can this be the position of extreme and radical defenders of *capitalism*? Quite simply, it can be so if we reject the idea that existing economic relations are truly capitalistic, rather than some form of statist corporatism.



Walter Block explains, in *Defending the Undefendable*, that “the possibility of profits shows the scope of unrequited trades and that the actual earnings of these profits indicates that these gaps are being filled.”^{vi} Thus making a profit is both only possible for those that are fulfilling a consumer’s actual desire for an exchange that is not being fulfilled by others, whilst serving as an incentive to do so, but also allows those profits to signal to producers that there are unrequited trades

that need making. Thus profits are beneficial, and preventing the earning of them is harmful.



However, after explaining this, Block makes the very important caveat most relevant to this section of my discussion: He says that this account “applies only to the free market economy.” Block insists that “a sharp, rigid, and basic distinction must be drawn between the profits that can be earned in the marketplace, and the profits that can be ‘earned’ through government subsidies and influence, in short, through the system of corporate-state capitalism.” Only if exchanges are voluntary can we say that profits are based on the voluntary choices of individual actors, and indicate and encourage solution of the wants or needs of the economy. On the other hand, “Profits in the ‘mixed’ economy (an economy that has elements of the free market as well as of coercion) might well be due to no more than the prohibition of competition.” As an example, Block points out that a tariff on imports would increase demand for domestic products, and so the profits available for supplying those products. So “it can hardly be concluded from this that any new information was uncovered, or that consumer satisfaction was increased. If anything the opposite would be the case. The tie between profits and well-being is thus sundered and we can no longer infer the latter

from the former.”^{vii} As such, then, the anarcho-capitalist defense of profit may not apply to existing economic relations, or, if it does, it does so only in a qualified manner.

Likewise, with other anarcho-capitalist justifications of market phenomena, such as advertising. Block defends advertising as a tool by which attention is drawn to a product, and to information about a product, thereby overcoming problems that would render the market inefficient without it. Advertising thereby ensures that productive exchanges occur that might not have otherwise. However, he then says, “Advertising can be defended only when it occurs on the free market. In the case of government or government-aided big business advertising, none of the free market defenses hold. Here people are forced to pay for the advertising whether they choose to buy the product or not. When the government advertises, it is with tax money collected on an involuntary basis.”^{viii}

The issue is, of course, that when anarcho-capitalists defend capitalism, their doing so can only be considered a defense of the *status quo* if the status quo is capitalist. But it isn’t – it is a mixed economy. Government agencies regulate and control our economies, and this allows exploitation of consumers or workers (“suppose the employers mutually agree *not* to hire workers at more than 5¢ per hour...such agreements can only succeed with state aid”^{ix}) by members of the regulated industries. “Regulation agency after regulation agency, from the ICC and CAB to FTC, FPC and others, have been shown to be regulating industry not for the benefit of the consumer, but for the benefit of the industry as against the consumer. This is not an accident. There is a reason for it.” This reason, Block explains, is because “each of us is a purchaser of literally thousands of items, but producers of only one. Our ability to influence regulatory legislation passed by the state is, therefore, much more concentrated as producers than as consumers. Government agencies, accordingly, tend to regulate in favor of the producing industry rather than the mass of

consumers. In fact, government regulatory agencies tend to be set up by the very industries they regulate.”^x

So, anarcho-capitalists may defend unequal incomes that arise as a result of voluntary exchanges: “when wealth is earned honestly, there is nothing inappropriate about being able to receive a greater share of goods or services.” On the other hand, though, “It is, of course, unfair to allow the rich to obtain a greater share of goods and services, to the degree that many of them amassed their fortunes not through the market, but because of government aid. However, eliminating the monetary system in order to rid it of illicitly gathered fortunes would be like throwing out the baby with the bath water. The answer lies in directly confiscating the ill-gotten wealth.”^{xi}



Confiscation of the results of state enforced exploitation? Expropriation? Yes, anarcho-capitalists have even advocated this. Anarcho-capitalists defend property rights, of course: but only over *justly acquired property*. Unjustly acquired property they readily condemn, and this condemnation implies that much property held in present society may be illegitimately held. So Rothbard actually condemns an economist that “managed to smuggle into his discussion [in defense of market activity] an unexamined ethic: that all goods ‘now’ (the time and place at which the discussion occurs) considered private property must be accepted and defended as such.” Such an

ethic would imply that “all private property titles designated by any existing *government* (which has everywhere seized the monopoly of defining titles to property) must be accepted as such.” Such an ethic is “blind to all considerations of justice” and must ultimately “also defend every criminal in the property he has managed to expropriate.” Hence Rothbard finds that he must “conclude that the utilitarian’s simply praising a free market based on *all existing* property titles is invalid and ethically nihilistic.”^{xii}

So Rothbard says that “we *cannot* simply say that the great axiomatic moral rule of the libertarian society is the protection of property rights” because criminals have no right to keep property they have stolen, or aggressors to property they have obtained by aggression. “In short, we cannot simply talk of defense of ‘property rights’ or of ‘private property’ *per se*...We may therefore only speak of just property or legitimate property.”^{xiii}

This would entail that anarcho-capitalists do not defend all existing claims of private property: They would not defend property rights in the profits of those who gain those profits due to state aggression. Indeed, as Block has been quoted as saying, such wealth may be confiscated.

In terms of how this confiscation is to be decided, Rothbard recognizes the principle of being innocent until proved guilty. He says that for any property currently claimed and used, (a) if we know clearly that there was no unjust origin to the current title, then the current title is just; but (b) if we don’t obviously know that the origins of the current title were unjust, but can’t find out either way, then we can consider it unowned to be appropriated by the first person to homestead it...which is the current owner of the title. So, if we know the origins of a title are just, the present owner is the just owner, if we can’t be sure that the origins are unjust, again the present owner is the just owner. However, Rothbard goes on to say, (c) if we do know the origins of the present title were unjust, but (c1) also know that the present holder of the title did not perpetrate the injustice, and we

cannot find a rightful owner, then the title becomes unowned to become the just property of the person who homesteads it, which must be the present possessor. But, (c2) if we know that the origins of the title are unjust, and that the present title holder is one of the criminals that stole the property, then the present holder may justly be deprived of it. If the rightful owner (the victim of the theft, or somebody that it can be proved would have been an heir) cannot be identified, so we cannot identify anybody that rightfully owns the property, but can identify somebody that doesn't (the present holder), then the property should be treated as not being rightfully owned by anybody yet, and so may be justly appropriated by the first party to homestead it (with the present holder in this case excluded from attempting to homestead it, since he is guilty for its having been stolen). And (d) if the present title is unjust, and a rightful owner (the original victim or an heir) *can* be identified then the title should revert to them.^{xiv}



A similar view is expressed in the writings of Hoppe. "But what about the theory of the reality of exploitation itself? Hoppe argues that it is fulfilled in the Austro-libertarian framework of looking at the world, once we understand that the ruling class is distinguished by its access to state power. This follows from Hoppe's new definition of exploitation, which occurs when a person successfully claims partial or full control over scarce resources that he has not homesteaded, saved, or produced, nor acquired contractually from a previous producer-owner. The state can be seen as a firm devoted entirely to the task of exploitation in this sense. This exploitation creates

victims, who can overthrow their exploiters once they develop a consciousness of the possibility of an exploitation-free society in which private property is universally respected and not systematically violated by a ruling class."^{xv}

Using this perspective, Rothbard is able to conclude that if A stole B's horse, and then C came along and stole the horse from B, we cannot condemn C as a thief, since he is not violating any just property title held by A over the horse, and may even be performing a virtuous act by depriving A of the fruits of his aggression. "Of course, it would still be better if he returned the horse to B, the original victim. But even if he does not, the horse is far more justly in C's hands than it is in the hands of A, the thief and criminal" so long as B cannot be identified.^{xvi} On this basis Rothbard says that "The libertarian sees the State as a giant gang of organized criminals, who live off the theft called 'taxation' and use the proceeds to kill, enslave, and generally push people around. Therefore any property in the hands of the State is in the hands of thieves, and should be liberated as quickly as possible." Since, unlike B, the victim of horse theft, the victim of state theft is not readily identifiable, this either means turning the property over to tax payers, giving them shares in it according to how much they paid, or selling it and giving them the proceeds, or it means that we "grant the moral right of ownership on the person or group who seizes the property from the State. Of this group, the most morally deserving are the ones who are already using the property but have no moral complicity in the State's aggression. These become the 'homesteaders' of the stolen property and hence the rightful owners." So, for example "the State universities...[are] property built on funds stolen from the taxpayers. Since the State has not found or put into practice a way of returning ownership of this property to the taxpaying public, the proper owners of this university are the 'homesteaders,' those who have already been using and therefore 'mixing their labor' with the facilities...This means student and/or faculty ownership of the universities."

Schools and universities to the students and teachers, then! In fact, those who regard libertarians and anarcho-capitalists as mere defenders of existing private enterprise should be surprised at Rothbard's fullest statement on the matter:

But if Columbia University, what of General Dynamics? What of the myriad of corporations which are integral parts of the military-industrial complex, which not only get over half or sometimes virtually all their revenue from the government but also participate in mass murder? What are *their* credentials to "private" property? Surely less than zero. As eager lobbyists for these contracts and subsidies, as co-founders of the garrison state, they deserve confiscation and reversion of their property to the *genuine* private sector as rapidly as possible. To say that their "private" property must be respected is to say that the property stolen by the horsethief and the murdered [sic] must be "respected."

But how then do we go about destatizing the entire mass of government property, as well as the "private property" of General Dynamics? All this needs detailed thought and inquiry on the part of libertarians. One method would be to turn over ownership to the homesteading workers in the particular plants; another to turn over pro-rata ownership to the individual taxpayers. But we must face the fact that it *might* prove the most practical route to first nationalize the property as a prelude to redistribution. Thus, how could the ownership of General Dynamics be transferred to the deserving taxpayers without first being nationalized en route? And, furthermore, *even if* the government should decide to nationalize General Dynamics—without compensation, of course—*per se* and *not as* a prelude to redistribution to the taxpayers, this is not immoral or something to be combated. For it would only mean that one gang of thieves—the government—would be confiscating property from another previously cooperating gang, the

corporation that has lived off the government.

VOTE FOR NOBODY

NOBODY WILL KEEP ELECTION PROMISES

NOBODY WILL LISTEN TO YOUR CONCERNES

NOBODY WILL HELP THE POOR AND UNEMPLOYED

NOBODY, CARES!

IF **NOBODY** IS ELECTED, THINGS WILL BE BETTER FOR EVERYONE



Of course, Rothbard does not presume that these nationalized corporations should long remain in state hands. He draws inspiration from the reforms towards workers control in Yugoslavia in the 1950s:

Beginning in 1952, Yugoslavia has been de-socializing at a remarkable rate. The principle the Yugoslavs have used is the libertarian "homesteading" one: the state-owned factories to the workers that work in them! The nationalized plants in the "public" sector have all been transferred in virtual ownership to the specific workers who work in the particular plants, thus making them producers' coops, and moving rapidly in the direction of individual shares of virtual ownership to the individual worker. What other practicable route toward destatization could there be? The principle in the Communist countries should be: land to the peasants and the factories to the workers, thereby getting the property out of the hands of the State and into private, homesteading hands.

In practice, then, Rothbard's policy entails that any firm that makes most of its money from the state, or gains its property from the state (perhaps by eminent domain) should be seized by the state (nationalized) and turned over to become the private property of the workers who work in it. This transfer of control of the means of production to the workers, the fields to the peasants, would, however, be complete. As such it would, or should, be completely different from state socialist

"reforms." For instance, in El Salvador, Duarte repeatedly claimed that peasants, under his system of land reforms, had become the owners of the land they worked. But the reality was much different, since, as Roy Childs pointed out, "If the peasants had become the true owners of the land, they would have the right to use, control and dispose of it as they saw fit."^{xvii} In reality, though, Duarte's decrees stated that "exploitation of said land is [to be] carried out in accordance with the government's agricultural plans" and "exploitation of said land guarantees the minimum productivity levels, in accordance with national percentages for the crop under exploitation." Ultimately, the reforms planned that "land and other real property thus acquired shall be administered as a joint venture of the government and such organizations." So much for workers control! So much for "the fields to peasants"! Childs describes the libertarian alternative to this state socialism that should have been followed in El Salvador:

True land reform of a libertarian variety would have returned feudal land titles to the peasants who worked the farms, and would have allowed them to decide how the land was to be used: communally, individually, in family plots, or in some combination of these. The peasants would have been free to divide up the land, if they wished, to organize formally as a collective, to decide what crops they would grow, to seek competitive sources for capital, to organize to market their products in a newly-freed economy, to bargain freely to set the prices of their crops and to arrange to export their products themselves – whatever they wished. But as the agrarian reform was organized, none of this was to take place.

Likewise, despite Rothbard's hopes and praises of the Yugoslavian worker's control experiment, fuller control of the enterprises should have been given to workers. As David Friedman notes, "Yugoslavian workers' cooperatives, which in effect, own factories as corporations own them here, must get capital for investment either from their own profits or the government." The trouble

with this is that some cooperatives that could get a large return from capital investments simply do not have the profits needed to finance those investments, whilst others cooperatives may well have large profits but do not need additional investments. The obvious solution, and the one that follows from saying that workers really do control their work places, and really are entitled to the incomes they generate in them, "is to allow cooperatives to make loans to each other and charge interest." In Yugoslavia workers were forbidden from agreeing to lend *their* profits, generated in *their* factories and workshops, with *their* means of production, to anybody else, on whatever terms they were able to find agreement to. This plainly diminishes the sense in which they are to have control over their means of production and the products of their labour, and any pretence that they should own such things.



Likewise, in Yugoslavia, Friedman noted "A worker cannot sell his share of his cooperative (which entitles him to a share of the profits), and he loses it on retirement." This means that workers who control the coop have no incentive to make investments in the coop whose return will only come after they have retired – investment will only occur if there is a high short-term gain, so the coop will be managed to maximize short term income, not long-term (in some cases, this would lead to

environmental depletion and damage). “The solution is to make the share transferable, like a share of stock. Its market value would depend on the expected future earnings of the cooperative. A long-term investment would lower the worker’s dividends but raise the value of his share. This reform, when and if it is made, will constitute a further step in the effective conversion of Yugoslavia to a capitalist society.”^{xviii}

Conclusion

So, let me sum up:

Anarcho-capitalists insist that they do qualify as anarchists, since they meet the dictionary definition (as well as Tucker’s). Socialist anarchists, on the other hand, state that anarcho-capitalists do not so qualify, since a proper definition of “anarchist” would be richer, reflecting the fact that historically anarchists have opposed capitalism, or been socialists of some sort. However, this sort of approach amounts to saying that “anarchism is what anarchism has been,” a vacuous tautology that also entails that anarchist communists cannot be anarchists since before them anarchists opposed communism.

It has been said that anarcho-capitalism cannot be a form of anarchism since it accepts as legitimate some authoritarian or hierarchical relationships, namely those within the firm. In response, first some anarcho-capitalists oppose such relationships. However, secondly, even accepting that some anarcho-capitalists could be happy with such authoritarian relationships, this could only be good grounds to disqualify them as anarchists if we also disqualified figures that epitomize traditional anarchism, such as Mikhail Bakunin, since Bakunin admitted to being happy with “voluntarily submission” to authorities selected because of their merit to the “submittee.” Likewise, claims that anarcho-capitalist and individualist anarchist advocacy of voluntary organizations to enforce rights against encroachment recreates statism apply equally to socialist anarchist advocacy of revolutionary organization against oppression.

Beyond this, socialist anarchists claim that they support voluntary socialism, as opposed to state socialism. However, if this is the case then they must think that people have a right to some sort of alternative to socialism, i.e., have a right to form or participate in capitalist alternatives. But in that case, we have a situation no different to that which anarcho-capitalists advocate, namely one in which people are secure in their property and the agreements they form with others, and some people use their person and property, or that of consenting others, to set up socialist arrangements and institutions. Complaints that anarcho-capitalists are happy with *unconsenting* others excluding people from resources they could use to establish these alternatives fall flat when it becomes apparent that anarchist socialists *also* support this, in order to ensure decentralization.



Socialist anarchists, along with other socialists, charge capitalism with being unjust. However, they do so by endorsing simultaneously sets of incompatible theories of justice, and ultimately are forced to choose between them, either rejecting the charge that capitalism is unjust

due to exploitation, or rejecting egalitarianism, or “distribution according to needs.”

And, finally, we saw that, contrary to providing an intellectual cover for an existing corporate elite, anarcho-capitalism provides a radical alternative to existing socio-economic relations.

ⁱ Spooner, Lysander, “The Law of Intellectual Property,” p 1

ⁱⁱ Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (Oxford, UK/Cambridge, MA: Blackwell), p 160. We should also note the market anarchist Benjamin Tucker, who saw himself as a socialist, and his reply to objections from Johann Most, an anarchist communist/syndicalist:

In No 121 of *Liberty*, criticizing an attempt of Kropotkin to identify Communism and Individualism, I charged him with ignoring “the real question of whether Communism will permit the individual to labor independently, own tools, sell his labor or his products, and buy the labor or products of others.” In Herr Most’s eyes this is so outrageous that, in reprinting it, he puts the words “the labor of others” in large black type. Most being a Communist, he must, to be consistent, object to the purchase and sale of anything whatever but why he should particularly object to the purchase and sale of labor is more than I can understand. Really, in the last analysis, labor is the only thing that has any title to be bought or sold. Is there any just basis of price except cost? And is there anything that costs except labor or suffering (another name for labor)? Labor should be paid! Horrible, isn’t it? Why, I thought that the fact that it is not paid was the whole grievance. “Unpaid labor” has been the chief complaint of all Socialists, and that labor should get its reward has been their chief contention. Suppose I had said to Kropotkin that the real question is whether Communism will permit individuals to exchange their labor or products on their own terms. Would Herr Most have been so shocked? Would he have printed that in black type? Yet in another form I said precisely that.

If the men who oppose wages - that is, the purchase and sale of labor - were capable of analyzing their thought and feelings, they would see that what really excites their anger is not the fact that labor is bought and sold, but the fact that one class of men are dependent for their living upon the sale of their labor, while another class of men are relieved of the necessity of labor by being legally privileged to sell something that is not labor, and that, but for the privilege, would be enjoyed by all gratuitously. And to such a state of things I am as much opposed as any one. But the minute you remove privilege, the class that now enjoy it will be forced to sell their labor, and then, when there will be nothing but labor with which to buy labor, the distinction between wage-payers and wage-receivers will be wiped out, and every man will be a laborer exchanging with fellow-laborers. Not to abolish wages, but to make *every* man dependent upon wages and secure to every man his

whole wages is the aim of Anarchistic Socialism. What Anarchistic Socialism aims to abolish is usury. It does not want to deprive labor of its reward; it wants to deprive capital of its reward. It does not hold that labor should not be sold; it holds that capital should not be hired at usury.

But, says Herr Most, this idea of a free labor market from which privilege is eliminated is nothing but “consistent Manchesterism.” Well, what better can a man who professes Anarchism want than that? For the principle of Manchesterism is liberty, and consistent Manchesterism is consistent adherence to liberty. The only inconsistency of the Manchester men lies in their infidelity to liberty in some of its phases. And this infidelity to liberty in some of its phases is precisely the fatal inconsistency of the *Freiheit* school, the only difference between its adherents and the Manchester men being that in many of the phases in which the latter are infidel the former are faithful, while in many of those in which the latter are faithful the former are infidel. Yes, genuine Anarchism is consistent Manchesterism, and Communistic or pseudo-Anarchism is inconsistent Manchesterism. “I thank thee, Jew, for teaching me that word.”

ⁱⁱⁱ Foxwell, in Menger 1889, *The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour* (London: Macmillan), p xx

^{iv} Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *The Economics and Ethics of Private Property* (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006), pp 117–38.

^v *The Libertarian Forum*, November 1, 1969, p 1

^{vi} Block, Walter, *Defending the Undefendable* (San Francisco: Fox and Wilkes), p 182

^{vii} *Ibid*, p 182

^{viii} *Ibid*, p 68

^{ix} *Ibid*, p 204

^x *Ibid*, p 67

^{xi} *Ibid*, p 86

^{xii} Rothbard, Murray N. 1998 (2002) *The Ethics of Liberty*, p 52

^{xiii} *Ibid*, p 51-2

^{xiv} *Ibid*, p 58-9

^{xv} Jeffrey A Tucker, “Marxism Without Polylogism,”

<http://mises.org/story/3677#note3>

^{xvi} Rothbard, Murray N. “Confiscation and The Homestead Principle,” *The Libertarian Forum*, June 15, 1969, p 3

^{xvii} Roy Childs, “El Salvador: The Myth of Progressive Reform,” in Childs 1994, *Liberty Against Power: Essays by Roy A. Childs, Jr.* (San Francisco: Fox and Wilkes), pp 79-80

^{xviii} David Friedman, *The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism* (La Salle, IL: Open Court), p 96

